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1. Introduction 
 The Indonesian Ministry of Industry admitted that 70 percent of the national 
manufacturing industries are not ready for AEC1. Moreover, according to Competitiveness 
Industrial Performance (CIP) index from the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) reported that in 2013, Indonesia’s manufacturing industries 
competitiveness were ranked 42nd far behind Singapore in 7th place, Malaysia in ranked 24th, 
and Thailand in 26th place (UNIDO, Industrial Development Report 2016: 199 – 200). 
 Low performance and competitiveness level in Indonesia’s manufacturing sector 
emerged post-1998 Asia’s regional economic crisis which made the manufacturing sector fell 
to “growth recession” (Rahardja, et.al. 2012: 3). Indonesia’s manufacturing sector was not 
able to fully recover compared to other ASEAN member countries, such as Malaysia and 
Thailand. The manufacturing industries in Indonesia are considered as a ‘backbone’ of the 
national economy. This sector contributes around 25 percent to the national gross domestic 
product (GDP), especially in non-oil industry. The manufacturing sector was on top of other 
Indonesia’s leading sectors, such as agriculture, fisheries, and marine industries which 
contribute 14 percent, as well as restaurants and hospitality areas that contribute 16 percent 
to national GDP.  
 It is interesting to contrast the low performance and competitiveness of Indonesia’s 
manufacturing sector with the plan for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). When fully 
implemented, AEC will create a single market and production base which makes more 
dynamic and competitive ASEAN with new structures and procedures support the realization 
of its existing economic programs; fast-tracking regional integration in the priority sectors; 
facilitating movement of business persons, talented and skilled labor; as well as to intensify 
the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN (AEC Blueprint, 2008: 5).  
 The AEC implementation will encourage a competitive atmosphere in a regional 
economic integration, and it can also stimulate higher intra-regional trade flow. Along with 
these benefits, economic integration also has its disadvantages such as the limitation of 
government authority in policies related to fiscal, monetary, and financial that can affect 
national economic performance. Other than that, the implementation of AEC also opens the 
possibility to create higher unemployment rate, and it can only turn a country into the market 
for imported products from other nations due to its lack of national competitiveness 
(Kementerian Perdagangan RI, 2011: 27). 
Many assumed that implementation of the AEC in 2015 as a regional economic 
integration creates a paradox for market participants. Theoretically, regional economic 
                                                          
1 Industri Manufaktur RI Tidak Siap Hadapi MEA. http://www.kemenperin.go.id/artikel/10267/Industri-
Manufaktur-RI-Tidak-Siap-Hadapi-MEA (accessed 5 November 2016).   
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integration would open up and expand market access and services, along with the availability 
of raw materials, capital, and investment which will influence the industrial structure and 
encourage more capacity building to improve domestic industries competitiveness as well as 
national purchasing power. 
In this thesis, I review the effects of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as one 
process of a regional economic integration, with a goal to create a single market and 
production base with free flow of goods, services, investments, capital, and skilled labor, in 
particular on the Indonesian manufacturing industry (Hew, 2007: 2). Thus, the main research 
questions of this thesis would be: is the Indonesian manufacturing industry ready for the 
AEC? 
In the present situation, only several Indonesia’s manufacturing sectors are willing to 
fully-implemented AEC, and their products can compete with manufacture products from other 
ASEAN member countries (Yogatama and Utami, 2014). However, the Indonesian 
government believed that the national manufacturing industries would be ready by the time 
AEC fully implemented because the government has set several measures to improve national 
manufacturing sector level of performance and competitiveness through enhancing industrial 
structures. 
After a brief introduction to the thesis topic and research question in the first section, 
the second section describes the institutional settings, namely the AEC and its ‘building blocks’ 
and the current performance of the Indonesia’s manufacturing industries. The third section is 
the conceptual framework which describes how a regional economic integration may affect 
the manufacturing sectors, as being suggested by Peter A. Petri2. The fourth section assesses 
the empirical findings whether Indonesia can meet the conditions for a positive effect of AEC 
on manufacturing industries, especially to improve its investment climate and the removal of 
Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). The last section serves as a conclusion as well as answering the 
thesis research question. 
 
2. Institutional Settings 
2. 1.     The ASEAN Economic Community and Its ‘Building Blocks' 
 Since its establishment, ASEAN leaders constantly emphasized on border issues, and 
economic integration was not brought up during the first three decades of the Association. On 
the other hand, the interest then changed from border issues to a deeper integration process 
(Lloyd, 2007: 30). Throughout the years, ASEAN has achieved significant organizational 
                                                          
2 Petri, Peter A., et.al. ASEAN Economic Community: A General Equilibrium Analysis. Asian Economic Journal. 
2012. Vol 26, No. 2: 93 – 118. 
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accomplishments, and ASEAN’s latest achievement was the implementation of ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. 
In January 2007, ten ASEAN member countries agreed to implement the AEC, with 
the goal of creating a free movement of goods, services, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and 
skilled labor, as well as ‘easier’ flows of capital in the Southeast Asian region. Soon afterward, 
the AEC Blueprint was signed in November 2007. The AEC Blueprint defines the four pillars 
of AEC that can be achieved through liberalization of trade in goods, services, and 
investments: (i) a single market and production base; (ii) a highly competitive region; (iii) a 
region of equitable economic development; and (iv) a region fully integrated into the global 
economy (IBON International, 2015: 5). 
The AEC has become the center of the Southeast Asian regional integration process, 
which shows the willingness to strengthen as well as widen the economic integration. The 
AEC is considered as the most progressive compared to the other ASEAN Community pillars3 
(IBON International, 2015: 5). AEC visualizes the development of regional production 
networks with the aim of improving its capability to function as a global production center for 
the global supply chain. With AEC implementation, ASEAN is envisaged to become a single 
market and production base with the ability to accelerate the movement not only of goods, but 
also of skilled labor, professionals, and tourists in general. According to AEC Blueprint, an 
ASEAN single market and production base consist of 5 (five) principal aspects: (i) free flow of 
goods; (ii) free flow of services; (iii) free flow of investment; (iv) free flow of capital; and (v) free 
flow of skilled labor (IBON International, 2015: 6). 
As a single market and production base, the Southeast Asian region will profit by 
economies of scale and effectiveness in manufacturing system processes. ASEAN could have 
an influence on economies at various stages of economic improvement to give corresponding 
settings for production systems. A cohesive market and production base would obviously 
enhance intra-regional trade and investment flows while a vast ASEAN consumer market 
would become a magnet for investors (Chia, 2013: 11). To fulfill the implementation of AEC, 
a High-Level Task Force (HLTF)4 on ASEAN Economic Integration was later established to 
give suggestions to bring about the AEC. The task force has submitted several 
recommendations for the AEC, among others: 
                                                          
3 ASEAN Community consists of 3 (three) pillars: ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC); and ASEAN Socio Cultural Community (ASCC). 
4 ASEAN High Level Task Force (HLTF) consists of 10 (ten) Senior Officials from each ASEAN member countries 
(appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs), as well as a resource person from the ASEAN Secretariat. In this 
regard, the task force responsibility is to provide consideration and recommendation related to the full 
implementation of ASEAN economic integration. http://asean.org/?static_post=recommendations-of-the-high-
level-task-force-on-asean-economic-integration (accessed on 18 November 2016). 
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“(i) accelerate current ASEAN economic integration programs, laying down clear 
timelines for specific measures in the areas of tariffs, non-tariff measures, customs, 
standards, services, investments, intellectual property rights, and finance; (ii) 
designate twelve priority sectors5 for accelerated integration with the coverage of each 
area broad enough to account for a substantial portion of intra-ASEAN trade and 
potential to maximize the complementarities among ASEAN economies and serve as 
a catalyst for expediting the integration process; (iii) adopt an “ASEAN minus X” 
formula in integrating the priority sectors. That is, two or more ASEAN members may 
initiate and participate in intra-ASEAN economic arrangements, while other ASEAN 
members may join when they are ready to do so; (iv) improve the CEPT rules of origin 
(ROO), including making the ROO more transparent, predictable, and standardized. 
Ensure transparency on non-tariff measures (NTMs), eliminate NTMs that are barriers 
to trade, establish an ASEAN database on NTMs, set clear and definitive work program 
for removal of NTBs, adopt the WTO agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary and Import Licensing Procedures, and develop 
implementation guidelines appropriate for ASEAN; also (v) establish new institutional 
mechanisms, including a legal unit of trade disputes in the ASEAN Secretariat, a 
compliance monitoring body for peer adjudication, and an impartial dispute settlement 
mechanism” (Chia, 2013: 11). 
 
The process of ASEAN economic integration has not started only by the AEC. It began 
with ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), soon after the signing of a Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme in 1992. CEPT scheme obliges ASEAN members to lower 
their tariff rates on a variety of commodities exchanged in the Southeast Asian region to 0 – 5 
percent. In 2003, the CEPT scheme was already fulfilled by ASEAN original members 
(ASEAN-5) and Brunei. However, for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV), they 
achieved its tariff elimination target not long after the ASEAN-6; For Vietnam was in 2006, 
Myanmar and Laos in 2008, and Cambodia were the last to reached the tariff elimination target 
in 2010. So far, ASEAN – 6 has reduced around 99.77 percent of their products in their CEPT 
Inclusion List to 0 – 5 percent (Hew, 2007: 5 – 6). Various conditions have affected the 
progressive improvement in ASEAN economic cooperation. Perhaps several comfort level 
with the process has been achieved over time, led the ASEAN member to be more eager to 
move faster toward the regional economic integration. The need to increase regional economic 
                                                          
5 12 (twelve) priority sectors which identified for integration are: (i) agro-based goods; (ii) air transport; (iii) 
automotive products; (iv) e-ASEAN (including ICT equipment); (v) electronics; (vi) fisheries; (vii) healthcare 
products; (viii) rubber-based products; (ix) textiles and apparel; (x) tourism; (xi) wood-based products; and (xii) 
logistics services. 
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competitiveness might be an answer to recuperate from the financial crisis as well as to face 
Chinese economic power that could infiltrate the Southeast Asian market (Hew, 2005: 14). 
Over the last decade, Free Trade Areas (FTAs) have been the focus of ASEAN 
members’ trade policy, both for individual countries and for ASEAN. In this regard, ASEAN 
has pursued a wider Asian and global trend: trade policy has changed from non-discriminatory 
unilateral liberalization, supported by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World 
Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) commitments, to preferential liberalization through FTAs. 
On theory, AFTA and its branches are solid agreements – models of strong regional economic 
cooperation. CEPT preceded to a tariff-free zone as well as removing the quantitative 
restrictions and other NTBs among ASEAN countries (Basu, et.al. 2013: 321 – 322). 
Besides AFTA, there are the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and 
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) that served as the ‘building blocks’ for AEC. AFAS is 
considered as a GATS-Plus agreement because its scope of liberalization in services set out 
from those already commenced under WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). Within the scope of services liberalization, AFAS applies a positive list approach from 
GATS framework, and there are 7 (seven) sectors that AFAS covers: (i) construction; (ii) 
financial services; (iii) business services; (iv) air transport; (v) tourism; (vi) maritime transport; 
and (vii) telecommunications. The implementation of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) 
set up a significant pace towards regional cooperation in the services sector because the 
MRAs will enable free movement of professional services providers in the region. There are 
three factors that ASEAN utilizes to classify relevant sectors for MRAs: (i) the value of intra-
regional trade; (ii) the existence of technical barriers; and (iii) an indication of strong interest 
from other ASEAN members (Hew, 2007: 7). 
The AIA intends to create a highly competitive investment area for ASEAN which 
appeals to Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) which not only from ASEAN members but also 
from non-ASEAN investors. With AIA agreements, ASEAN members are required to lessen 
or remove investment barriers and exempt national treatment for investors from ASEAN by 
and non-ASEAN investors by 2020. AIA agreement will foster ASEAN investors to implement 
a regional investment policy as well as to encourage regional production systems. On its 
implementation, AIA projected to offer a wider range of labor classification and industrial 
activities within the Southeast Asian region, building prospects for better industrial productivity 
and cost competitiveness. AIA can also benefit investors through larger access for investment 
in the economic and industrial sectors. It can also benefit from more ambitious and open 
investment schemes which make a low-cost business transaction within the region (Hew, 
2007: 6). 
Regarding the regional economic integration and the implementation of an AEC, the 
Association has eliminated, taxes obligations on the majority of intra-ASEAN trade. It put down 
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the fundamentals of regional economic integration by restating the ASEAN members’ promise 
to eliminate NTBs to intra-ASEAN trade. ASEAN member countries have officially agreed on 
several agreements, such as (i) the Customs Code of Conduct; (ii) the national and regional 
“Single Window” mechanisms; (iii) the ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomenclatures; and (iv) the 
WTO’s mode of customs valuation. ASEAN have determined several “framework” agreements 
on the liberalization of trade in the various area (information and communication technology; 
goods-in-transit; multi-modal and interstate transport; services, and investments). Also, 
ASEAN has settled on MRAs or its correspondent for three categories of goods and eight 
types of professions (architecture; accountancy; surveying; engineering; medical practitioners; 
dental practitioners; tourism; and nurses), as well as completed a “framework” agreement on 
MRAs protecting traded products would prevent duplication in products analysis at exports 
and imports completion, whereas those related to services normally give mutual recognition 
of professional qualifications. Even though nearly all of these agreements based on the 
ASEAN flexibility, and all member countries have not consented several of the accords, it 
appears to show the willingness and liability of ASEAN members on regional economic 
integration (Severino and Menon, 2013: 11). 
ASEAN members thought that they need to lower their reliance on developed-country 
market and on a small number of export products, whose costs in the world market had a 
tendency to sway uncontrollably while their manufactured imports costs gradually raised. They 
realized the potentials of the regional market for important industries in critical sectors to speed 
up economic development (Severino, 2006: 213). ASEAN is willing to create an economic 
community because of the escalating competitiveness on the current economic situation, and 
also Southeast Asia’s main concerns that China and India would overtake the region as the 
newly emerging market economies. In dealing with that matter, AEC could help to stimulate 
and create ASEAN economies more competitive. A unified ASEAN with its large market 
reaching 500 million people would keep the regional pulling factor as a destination for foreign 
investment and revitalize regional manufacturer networks (Hew, 2005: 4). 
 
2. 2.    Current Condition on Indonesia’s Manufacturing Industries 
The economic level of ASEAN member countries is significantly varied, not only in 
population, but also in economic structure, and income per capita. To some extent, they had 
imbalanced performance level, although strong on average. Over the past two decades, the 
region’s annual growth rate reached 5 percent, even though two major financial crises. In 
particular, the economic development is significant in Indonesia, as the largest economy in 
the region, which has initiated extensive reforms in politic and economic (Petri, et.al. 2012: 
95). 
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Indonesia’s manufacturing production has displayed convincing growth under present 
quarters, although still fall behind compared to the growth rates before Asian crisis. 
Indonesia’s non-oil and gas manufacturing products increased by on average of 12 per cent 
per year between 1990 – 1996. Between Post-Asian financial crisis in 1997 – 1998, 
manufacturing performances that used to be the main driver of Indonesian industrialization 
plunged into a ‘growth recession’ and contributed little to GDP growth. Thus the global financial 
crisis in 2008 speeded up this downward trend. On the other hand, Indonesia’s manufacturing 
index began to improve in the fourth quarter of 2009 and increased at a rate of 4.5 percent 
per year. Later in the last quarter of 2010, medium and large manufacturing product has raised 
and achieved 5.6 per cent year-on-year in the third quarter of 2011. The key factors of this 
current improvement in manufacturing products development were automotive machinery and 
spare parts (29.8 per cent year-on-year), chemicals (19.8 percent year-on-year), and basic 
metals (14.2 percent year-on-year) industries (Rahardja, et.al. 2012: 3). 
Flexibility in domestic need has become an influential part of the current pick-up in 
Indonesia’s manufacturing sectors, particularly for basic metals, food, chemicals, and 
automotive parts. Domestic demand has proved to be an excellent resilience since the global 
financial crisis started. It raised by 5.4 percent in the first three-quarters of 2011 year-on-year 
as a result of the constant rise in private consumption, adding 2.7 percentage points to real 
GDP growth on 2010. Real investment in machinery also improved rapidly even though being 
more expose to the business cycle, as indicated by an input of only 0.79 of a percentage point 
to real GDP growth in 2009 compared with 2.67 percentage points in 2008, and grew by on 
average 17 percent year-on-year during the first three quarters of 2011 (Rahardja, et.al. 2012: 
3). 
Although the GDP growth from manufacturing sectors is getting bigger, this 
improvement was not followed by their higher level of competitiveness. Because during the 
last 20 years Indonesia’s manufacturing industries competitiveness level stagnated as a result 
of low productivity in consumer-based industries product. This condition reflected in UNIDO 
2013 CIP Index which ranked Indonesia in 42nd place. Indonesia’s significant population 
increase restraints the national competitiveness level. It creates higher demand on domestic 
industries, which usually small-scale and low-technology, were demanded to meet basic 
national needs, such as food and beverages, toiletries, clothing, furniture, and shoes. 
Moreover, the contribution of medium and high-technology industries just reached 35,7 
percent from value added manufactured exports and 40,3 per cent shared in total exports just 
in 2013. On the other hand, the contribution of high-technology industries and value added 
per capita are low as a result of high population and national industries development that are 
still focused on the production of consumer-based products (Gosta, Demis Rizky, 2016). 
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Indonesia could gain profit from the full implementation of AEC because of the 
economic growth, especially on development in manufacturing sectors, and proper industrial 
infrastructures must support this development. Such improvement will also maintain the 
domestic market because the improvement in manufacturing industries in other Indonesian 
regions will make the market price more competitive. Furthermore, Indonesia expects to 
become a manufacturing hub for the Southeast Asian region with the support of improved 
national manufacturing industries as well as having 40 percent of the overall ASEAN market 
(Puja6, 2016). 
The Indonesian government planned to expand the national manufacturing base by 
reducing the focus on Java Island as well as spreading out the industrial production. Around 
70 percent of the PPnational industrial estates are located in Java, which keeps on drawing 
potential investment flow. In recent years, there have been concerns about increasing costs 
in land and labor around West Java Province and particularly around Jakarta area, which 
made Indonesia lost a few of its competitive advantage as a magnet for investments in 
manufacturing sectors. The Indonesian government intended to set up 36 additional industrial 
hubs outside the Java Island in the upcoming 20 years. The government is also planning to 
revitalize the proportion of manufacturers which in other islands out of Java from 27 percent 
at new level headed for 40 percent by 2025 (Oxford Business Group, 2014). 
In fact, the Indonesian government and business sectors acknowledge that national 
industries are still not ready for AEC. According to the official statement of Indonesian Ministry 
of Industry only 31 per cent of the total manufacture industry sectors that could compete in 
ASEAN market, namely: (i) agro-based industries (CPO, cacao, and rubber); (ii) fishery and 
dairy products; (iii) textile and textile products; (iv) footwear and leather products; (v) food and 
beverages; (vi) furniture; (vii) fertilizers and petrochemicals; (viii) machineries; and (ix) metal, 
iron, and steel. The other industries are still less competitive to compete in this market, such 
as (i) electronic components industries; (ii) Information Technology (IT) industries; (iii) 
household electronic appliances industries; and (iv) basic manufacture industries (Lubis, 
2016). In addition, around 64 per cent from total raw and auxiliary materials of national 
manufacture products are still relied on import to support its production, and also this 
calculation has not included several other factors, such as national economic slowdown, the 
downfall of commodity prices, and rupiah currency depreciation (Yogatama and Utami, 2014). 
  According to Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (National Medium 
Term Development Plan – RPJMN) 2015 – 2019 published by Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Nasional (Indonesian National Development Planning Agency - Bappenas), 
                                                          
6 H. E. I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja is the current Indonesian Ambassador to the Kingdom of Netherlands. He 
served as Director General for ASEAN Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as Senior Official 
Meeting (SOM) Leader on several ASEAN meetings for the period of 2012 – 2016. 
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there are several problems in Indonesian manufacturing industries, namely: (i) corruption, 
collusion, nepotism, and also poor public services; (ii) relatively high cost of money; (iii) 
ineffective tax administration; (iv) high import content; (v) lack of expertise and technology 
application; (vi) low quality of human resources; (vii) unhealthy environment for competition; 
(viii) inadequate industrial structures; (ix) least contribution of small and medium industries; 
and (x) most of the national industries located in Java. Comparatively, the condition of 
manufacture industries in Indonesia makes it difficult for Indonesia to catch up with other 
ASEAN’s main competitors in order to become the major player in the regional market. If this 
conditions did not progress significantly, Indonesia would not be able to perform well in the 
regional competition as well as not able to receive benefit from regional economic integration. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
When fully implemented AEC will have important structural effects. One important 
driver for this possible outcome is the ability to develop a stronger manufacturing sector in 
ASEAN, especially for Indonesia. The manufacture products are highly tradable and valuable 
from scale effects related to larger regional production and trade. The productivity growth in 
the manufacturing sector will boost the region comparative advantage in some important 
manufacturing sub-sectors, which lead to further intra-regional exchange along with additional 
exports to third markets. Petri (2012) suggested that the development of more growing 
manufacturing sectors will rest on the two elements of AEC: (i) the NTBs removal; and (ii) 
improvement in the investment climate. In general, emerging manufacturing productivity will 
change ASEAN’s comparative advantage on manufacturing, thus away from primary materials 
and services (Petri, et.al. 2012: 113). 
Although tariff removal is also one of the required action to create a free flow of goods 
in AEC, Petri (2012) argued that it is not an essential factor to the manufacturing industries 
because the tariff applied by ASEAN member countries are relatively low, and a 
comprehensive analysis of ASEAN trade policy settings indicate that: 
“(i) protection is relatively high in agriculture and beverage products relative to 
manufactures (with the exceptions of chemicals, transport equipment, and clothing fo 
some countries); (ii) protection is reasonably symmetric otherwise, in any given 
country, tariffs are similar across most commodity categories; (iii) protection tends to 
fall with income. The region’s wealthiest economies, like Singapore and Brunei, have 
essentially free-trade regimes, those with intermediate incomes, like Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, have mostly low tariffs, and its low-income 
economies, like Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, have relatively high tariffs, although 
Myanmar is an anomaly because of its low tariffs” (Petri, et.al. 2012: 97). 
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3. 1. Removal of NTBs 
To increase trade, countries have cut down tariffs over the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rounds and within regional trade agreements, for instance, ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). On the other hand, many national rules, regulations, and procedures still become a 
limitation to imports. Various “non-tariff” procedures are legally contributing to help the people 
as well as safeguarding the health, welfare, and the environment. Another measures are very 
obstructive and demanding which contradicts the international standards on trade (USAID, 
2013: 1). 
 USAID (2013) proposed that the NTBs cover various government acts which 
influencing trade. NTBs could be clearly protectionist, on the cost of foreign merchants. NTBs 
will possibly aid national industries, by no means to impair global competition; otherwise, it 
could be a non-protectionist policy yet intentionally restraining particular trade. However, if the 
NTBs are mainly inflicted to protect the national industry, it becomes issues to argued in the 
WTO which unfavorable for the imposing country (USAID, 2013: 1). 
The effect of tariffs (duties or levies put on specific categories of exports or imports) is 
instantly visible. On the contrary, the effect of NTBs is usually hard to determine and calculate. 
For instance, estimates of the effect of the additional permit, additional health licenses, or 
allotted controls can be unclear and debatable. Thus, NTBs are commonly recognized to 
increase the cost of doing business, which also difficult to eliminate compare than tariff 
barriers. Removing tariffs can easily be done by a country, although distinctive rules and 
procedures, along with permitting regulations as a principal of national NTBs might concern 
various ministries and institutions (USAID, 2013: 1 – 2). 
 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) describes NTBs as:  
 
“policy measures, other than ordinary customs tariffs that can potentially have an 
economic effect on international trade in goods changing quantities traded, or prices 
or both” (USAID, 2013: 2). 
 
UNCTAD also point out that NTBs can be categorized into technical measures7 and 
non-technical measures8. The two categories of measurements could possess legal 
principles, particularly from the government’s point of view. On the other hand, it also can be 
                                                          
7 Technical measures can comprise of standards on Sanitary Phytosanitary (SPS); regulations on product 
dimension, packaging, or mass; component or specification; compulsory labelling; import testing; and 
documentation processes (USAID, 2013: 2). 
8 Non-technical measures can consist of administrative controls; subsidies or additional authorized procedures 
that hampering trade, for instance: neglecting a proper and applicable measure in securing intellectual property 
(USAID, 2013: 2). 
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utilized to furtively obstructing trade. Even though the descriptions of NTBs have a tendency 
on goods, NTBs also influenced trade in services. The trade in services, involving agriculture-
related services, is an increasing percentage of ASEAN’s GDP. Restrictions on movements 
of services, which involve limitations on professional accreditations and complicated visa 
regulations, assumed to impede the increase of ASEAN’s GDP (USAID, 2013: 2). 
Based on the AEC Blueprint, a free flow of goods is one of the principal means that 
the aims of a single market and production base can achieve. A single market for goods (and 
services) will support the regional development of production networks and improve ASEAN’s 
capacity to operate as a global production center or as a part of the global supply chain. 
ASEAN has made remarkable progress with the tariff removal through the implementation of 
AFTA, but the free flow of goods would need not only zero tariffs but also the removal of non-
tariff barriers (AEC Blueprint, 2008: 6). 
In its effort to implement AEC, ASEAN has achieved tariff reduction, although NTBs 
seems to hamper it. As an essential part of the liberalization agenda of ASEAN member states, 
the progress in the removal of NTBs is not significant enough. NTBs could weaken the 
economic integration process throughout the AEC because of unclear effects of NTBs on the 
economy. NTBs can limit or might promote the trade. Moreover, NTBs may influence various 
products and different countries in numerous aspects (Austria, 2013: 32). 
Austria (2013) suggested that the phrase “NTBs” is also known as “on-tariff measure.” 
Non-tariff measures (NTMs) related to any measure, other than the tariff, which interferes the 
trade and it assigned by any means to decrease potential world profit. NTMs consist of border 
and behind-the-border measures that come from government policies, procedures, and 
administrative conditions which enforced for a specific reason. In domestic policy, NTMs could 
become NTBs because it purposely separates imports or foreign businesses, as well as being 
used to protect domestic industry (2013: 33). Therefore, Petri argued that NTBs include import 
quotas and less well-defined barriers, namely licensing requirements, restrictive product 
standards, and protection from anti-dumping. Other findings analyzed the NTBs by ‘scoring’ 
recognized barriers, while other ascribe barriers by calculating the shortage in a trade to an 
estimated levels (Petri, et.al. 2012: 97). 
 
3. 2. Improving the Investment Climate 
 AEC aims to fulfill a more comprehensive investment agreement which should be 
innovative, with developed aspects, necessities, and requirements that would give assurance 
to the investor in ASEAN, which in turn could improve regional integration and maintaining a 
competitive investment area (AEC Blueprint, 2008: 12). Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
describe investment climate as: 
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“the policy, institutional and behavioral settings, both present and expected, that 
influences the returns and risks associated with investments. There are 3 (three) broad 
sets of factors that make up the investment climate: (i) macro-fundamentals, which 
include macroeconomic stability, economic openness, competitive markets, as well as 
social and political stability; (ii) governance and institutions, comprises of transparency 
and efficiency in regulation, taxation and legal system, a robust and well-functioning 
financial sector, labor market flexibility, and a skill labor force; (iii) infrastructure, 
consists of transportation (roads and ports), telecommunications, also power and 
water supply” (2005: 8). 
 
The implementation of AEC will give remarkable consequences for the flow of 
investment in ASEAN by enlarging the scale and scope of economies in the region. Based on 
the AEC Blueprint, the free flow of investment, especially FDI, was built upon the AIA-initiated 
process. Later on, AEC will incorporate different agreement related to FDI, such as investment 
protection and accentuate the foundations of the AIA, namely national treatment, investment 
facilitation and cooperation, and promotion, arranged in the ASEAN Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment (ACIA) (Bhaskaran, 2013: 154). 
AEC Blueprint specifies a comprehensive framework that covers mutually reinforcing 
procedures that will improve the investment climate of the member countries. One single 
market and production base will allocate the most efficient distribution of resources through 
the excluding of uncompetitive businesses and improve the flow of information, as well as 
enhancing the potential scale of economies over a greater market (Bhaskaran, 2013: 155). 
Regarding AEC implementation to improve the investment climate, Aldaba and Yap 
(2009) suggested that four factors show substantial effects on investment flows: 
“(i) the ACIA is more comprehensive than previous agreements and provides a wide 
range of investment provisions on investment liberalization, most-favored-nation 
(MFN) and national treatment, and investment protection, promotion, and facilitation. 
The lifting of foreign ownership restrictions, sector restrictions and performance 
requirements is expected to increase FDI. Similarly,  deeper integration features, such 
as the legislation and harmonization of standards; competition and custom laws, 
intellectual property rights and dispute settlement mechanisms, will improve the 
region’s investment climate particularly in services; (ii) the improvement of trade flows 
will significantly raise the level of vertical FDI in the region, as the development of 
complex networks – comprising the fragmentation of production and trade in parts and 
components – dominates intra-regional trade and investment; (iii) a larger market will 
prove more attractive for foreign MNCs; and (iv) studies have shown that regional 
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integration may affect FDI by generating growth, although the causation for the positive 
relationship between FDI and economic growth is uncertain” (Bhaskaran, 2013: 156). 
 
The AEC Blueprint has a better prospect to create a constructive outcome than the 
previous schemes because it includes extensive regulations that encourage ASEAN members 
to perform well in critical economic areas (Bhaskaran, 2013: 156). 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
4. 1. Can Indonesia Significantly Improve Its Investment Climate in the Manufacturing 
Industry in the Next Three Years? 
 Nowadays, Indonesia has attained macroeconomic stability although the investment 
sector is at a low level, and national consumption is the main factor that caused the ongoing 
improvement. Present economic development of 4-5 per cent each year is not sufficient to 
extensively raise per capita income, provide the growing number of new applicants to the labor 
market, and reduce poverty. Improving the level of investment is crucial, but this is a 
challenging process regarding increasing investment and gaining high growth to improve the 
investment climate (Asian Development Bank, 2005: 45). 
 Indonesian policymakers and the business community agree that uncertain business 
settings are two crucial factors that hinder investment in the country. The corporate sector also 
revealed that difficulties in entrepreneurship are caused by several issues, such as insecurity 
in macroeconomic; regulatory uncertainty, such as licensing and taxes; weak law 
enforcement; and inadequate infrastructures (Moccero, 2008: 6). 
 Research done by the Investment Climate Study (ICS) indicates that numerous 
aspects of the investment climate in Indonesia require major consideration. The research 
findings from firm-level evaluation and cross-country assessments underline the serious need 
for development in the whole investment climate. Findings on firm-level evaluation revealed 
that: 
“(i) macroeconomic stability, economic and regulatory policy uncertainty and corruption 
are the most severe business obstacles; (ii) access to formal financing is a major 
problem, particularly for medium firms; (iii) labor regulations are a serious concern, 
more so than labor skills; (iv) the constraints are felt more by big business, foreign 
firms, and exporters; (v) across provinces, fundamental problems leading to low 
investment and productivity persist but vary in scope and degree; and (vi) 
decentralization which implemented since January 2001 has led to greater economic 
and regulatory uncertainty and increased corruption” (Asian Development Bank, 2005: 
1). 
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Furthermore, results from the cross-country assessments suggest that: 
“(i) more firms in Indonesia are concerned over key investment climate than in other 
countries in the region, and the most severe constraints felt have to do with overall 
uncertainty; (ii) key governance indicators are also weak and starting up and closing a 
business take longer and are costlier in Indonesia; (iii) the tax rate in Indonesia is 
similar to those in other countries in the region, but tax administration has become a 
source of concern; (iv) financing costs and access have become more problematic, 
making bank financing less popular; and (v) Indonesia appears to have more restrictive 
labor regulations, in particular with respect to hiring and firing procedures and wage 
setting” (Asian Development Bank, 2005: 2). 
 
In relations to AEC, its full implementation could encourage Indonesia’s economic 
growth, particularly in the manufacturing industries. To do that, Indonesia must improve the 
national investment climate. There are two important aspects which related to the 
improvement of the investment climate that Indonesia needs to resolve which in line with the 
country’s commitment under the AEC Blueprint, namely: (i) investment protection; and (ii) 
investment facilitation and cooperation. 
 
4. 1. A. Investment Protection 
 Two factors become the main concern which relates to the investment protection in 
Indonesia: (i) governance and uncertainty; and (ii) corruption. The most severe limitations 
influencing Indonesian business is related to uncertainty because uncertainty in government 
policies and regulations complicates the business and investments. In Indonesia, the business 
regulatory environment as one of the main restrictions to exporters and businesses. Indonesia 
is regarded to be one of the unhealthiest countries for investment in the Southeast Asian 
region. Investors emphasize specifically on the lack of transparency in the regulatory system 
as their largest restraint. The condition seems to worsen in current years. Moreover, it is 
related to the decentralization process in Indonesia that led to the difficulties of overlapping 
and ambiguous procedures between national and local level. Investors have indicated that the 
majority of local level regulations gave them much trouble, such as exclusive fees for foreign 
employers, street light taxes for companies using generators, and parking fees within the 
companies own area. The major effect on firms is predictable which might discourage firms to 
invest for development, especially in SME sector (Winkler and Farole, 2012: 9). 
 Indonesia’s performance in policy sector associated with the state-controlled economy, 
gave a contribution to the volume of the public enterprise sector, along with the exploitation of 
command-and-control regulations. Limitation on foreign ownership in domestic companies 
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remains and excessive business regulations by local government, due to decentralization 
process, also burdens the business environment (Moccero, 2008: 7). 
 In Indonesia, there are huge distinctions in how rules are written and applied. National 
interest repeatedly takes benefits from the non-transparent judicial and legal systems to 
impose regulations which become disadvantages for foreign companies. The provincial and 
sub-provincial governments were given a substantial amount of authorities under the new laws 
on regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization, which being use by the local government to 
require non-tax barriers on inter-regional trade as a mean to obtain new income sources (US 
Commercial Services, 2015: 40). Indonesia’s decentralization process which happened in 
2001 has made an unpleasant effect on the investment climate because of the escalating 
barriers caused by excessive regulations issued by local government. This condition inflicts 
unnecessary regulations that increase the business transaction costs and restraining 
investments, which also leads to corruption. 
 Corruption is also the main issue which raises the cost of doing business in Indonesia, 
specifically for foreign investors. As stated by World Bank’s Enterprise Survey in Indonesia, 
some companies see corruption as the biggest problem in doing business. This condition also 
supported by the Monitoring the Investment Climate in Indonesia (MICI) survey of 
manufacturers, which indicated “corruption in local government” as the third largest problem 
of doing business (Winkler and Farole, 2012: 10). Many companies suggest that the 
procedures required in complying with state rules, whether through licensing or customs, 
where corruption appeared, and within this point, is still counted as a common “cost of doing 
business” (Winkler and Farole, 2012: 10). 
 For example, starting up and closing a business in Indonesia are time and cost 
consuming because companies have to pass 12 procedures in order to start a business in 
Indonesia. This condition is not in line with the Investment Coordination Board (Badan 
Koordinasi Penanaman Modal - BKPM) which claims that only 10 days is needed to approve 
initial investments after all the administrative documents are completed, and the total number 
of days starting a business in Indonesia is approximately 151 days which is less 60 days 
compared to the neighbouring countries. Furthermore, about six years needed to complete 
business closing procedures, which based on the average duration of the insolvency lawyers 
(Asian Development Bank, 2005: 36). 
 Based on these conditions, several important policy implications can be drawn for the 
purpose of forming investment protection. In this kind of situation, the government must start 
institutional reform in relevant fields. Institutional matters can generate uncertainty, excessive 
regulations, and administrative problems, adverse investment and business climate in 
Indonesia. These issues also give warning to the potential investors, further underlining the 
demand for institutional reforms (Asian Development Bank, 2005: 46). 
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 The business atmosphere should be enhancing to assist the private-sector 
improvement and progress. There is an extensive concurrence, also backed by business 
reviews, that there are several circumstances which hinder the entrepreneurship and business 
prospects: (i) weak regulatory framework; (ii) limitations in capacity; and (iii) poor governance. 
Moreover, other excessive rules and regulations issued by the local government are also 
burdening the business environment (Moccero, 2008: 19). 
The government has to guarantee the contract implementation and property right, also 
maintaining the policy of reliability. The present efforts to create a “one-stop” investment 
service and to enhance the current investment law are a progressive move that should be 
supported by comprehensive policies, such as restructuring the role of local and central 
governments in investment procedures. Thus, there is also demand for capacity building for 
local governments. Well-organized measures for burden sharing between the local and central 
government in investment-related liabilities can be established through the implementation of 
investment regulations and license. Well-improved budget distribution between central and 
local governments is also essential to guarantee enough resources for local government to 
accept their new tasks and prevent them from corruption and extortion of retribution (Asian 
Development Bank, 2005: 46). To make the measures effective, the government must have a 
comprehensive policy action that builds concerted effort within various policy areas. More 
initiatives must be formed to intensify the regulatory structure, especially by eliminating 
excessive bureaucracy at local government, developing good governance system, as well as 
decreasing restraints on foreign investment (Moccero, 2008: 19). 
By observing Indonesia’s current condition and also the policy that national 
government tries to implement, within three years the country would not be able to increase 
its investment protection as well as improve the national investment climate, as provided in 
AEC, because of the level of corruption is still high in almost every business sector. The 
government is lacking coordination within the central and local government. There is also an 
uncertain regulatory system resulted in excessive bureaucracy which increases the cost of 
doing business in Indonesia. 
 
4. 1. B. Investment Facilitation and Cooperation 
Access to financial resources and the availability of adequate infrastructures are the 
most crucial factors related to the development of investment facilitation and cooperation, 
especially in manufacturing sectors. These factors are needed to become a pulling factor for 
foreign and domestic investments. Similar to many countries, access to finance has become 
a limitation for Indonesian manufacturers. The result from international surveys shows that, 
compared to the neighboring countries in the region, Indonesian manufacturers did not use a 
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formal, bank-intermediated financing, with only 18 per cent of businesses having loan or credit 
from banks (Winkler and Farole, 2012: 10). 
In the current condition, efforts in this matter are leaning towards providing additional 
sources of finance for investment by granting SMEs and informal based business more access 
to credit due to their limited recoverable capital that can be used as a bank loan warranty. The 
lack of warranty is one of the principal cause which makes small business becoming incapable 
of borrowing money from formal financial institutions. The need for a strong government 
commitment to the financial sector aimed to assess market failures and to feed directed credit 
to targeted economic sectors and activities (Moccero, 2008: 23). 
 Recent research also points out that transportation and trade facilitation is also one of 
the biggest problems for exporters in Indonesia. Logistics costs are high in Indonesia due to 
Indonesia’s geographical position as an archipelagic country. As stated by the World Bank’s 
Logistics Performance Index, Indonesia’s infrastructure, customs, and competence level of 
logistic industries, is at the lowest level compared to its neighboring countries. For exporters, 
this data indicated a higher cost, extensive notification and more uncertainty for business in 
Indonesia (Winkler and Farole, 2012: 11). 
 There is competitiveness gap in Indonesia’s national industries which related to high 
cost of transportation, caused by Indonesia’s inadequate infrastructure facilities. Less 
investment in roads and ports infrastructure sectors caused the major obstruction problems. 
On the coastal areas of Indonesia, this condition is related to a monopoly in port operations 
since the old state era. The introduction of Indonesia National Single Window (INSW) which 
recognized by the exporters has improved the situation in many ways. Conversely, many 
exporters reveal that, regardless of the INSW, the exporters are regularly obliged to work with 
a paper-based system in parallel (Winkler and Farole, 2012: 12). 
 With the aim of improving the investment climate in Indonesia, several problems in 
investment facility and cooperation also need to be resolved by the Indonesian government. 
The government must increase the accessibility of infrastructure for business on a daily basis 
which is crucial to gather new investment and to guarantee the stability of investment projects. 
Transportation breakdowns, power interruptions, and insufficient water supply have resulted 
in losses among the companies in Indonesia and delaying their business processes. The 
government also needs to solve present infrastructure hold-ups to prevent a potential problem 
in the future and to observe areas that are lacking start-up connection in which the 
infrastructure is located. Furthermore, Indonesia needs to create new incentive packages 
which can stimulate a better investment climate to attract foreign and domestic investors. The 
incentive must present on an equal basis for both foreign and national investors. For that 
reason, the incentive packages must be relevant to the comprehensive framework which 
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effectively benefits the national comparative advantage and increases its competitiveness 
(Asian Development Bank, 2005: 47). 
 
4. 2. Can Indonesia Significantly Remove the Manufacturing NTBs in the Next 
 Three Years? 
The average tariff rate of less than 5 percent is a significant development on tariff 
liberalization which highlighted the ASEAN economic integration. The development in tariff-
reduction is not in line with the removal of NTBs or NTMs. Although the commitment to remove 
NTBs has continuously become a vital part of ASEAN liberalization program, the improvement 
is not significant (Austria, 2013: 31). The progress of the NTBs removal in the ASEAN not in 
line with the commitments made under the 2009 AEC Roadmap. NTBs, at the border9 and 
beyond the border10, are still inadequately tackled. There is a large percentage of the regional 
total costs consist in those NTBs. Although there has been a decrease in non-tariff trade costs 
throughout the previous years, the regional performance is still overshadowed by the East 
Asian countries (China, Japan, South Korea) (Austria, 2013: 79). 
For Indonesia, unfortunate economic situations that happened in the past have made 
the Indonesian leaders to enact economic reforms. However, as the economic performance 
has reduced in the early year, the government started to intensify protective actions through 
various type of NTBs. These actions are expected to raise prices for Indonesian customer in 
a period when their purchasing ability is decreasing, and weaken the level of competitiveness 
and productivity of Indonesian businesses. Several reasons, such as a resilient rupiah 
currency, anti-foreign outlook, more intense rivalry with China in the global market, as well as 
a mainstream approach by President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) have all merged to drive 
Indonesia into the policy of protectionism. Even though it might give negative outcomes for 
Indonesian customers and businesses, such approaches are expected to endure (Patunru 
and Rahardja, 2015: 1). 
According to research conducted by Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East 
Asia (ERIA) on Indonesia’s NTMs, there are 199 NTM-related regulations issued by 14 
Indonesian ministries/agencies. This condition shows that the decentralization process had an 
impact on Indonesian legal structure (Munadi, 2016: 67). In relation to this subject, the 
Indonesian Ministry of Trade plays an important role of most NTM issued in the country. 
Because, consumer protection, as well as national trade safeguards, are the Ministry of 
Trade’s main concern in guarding the national interests (Munadi, 2016: 69). Some NTMs 
                                                          
9 NTBs at the border includes: new import procedures; additional requirements for importation; technical 
barriers to trade; non-automatic licensing; import bans; and import subsidies (Austria, 2013: 79). 
10 NTBs beyond the border includes: investment measures and trade facilitation-related measures; public 
procurement requirements; and state-aid measures (Austria, 2013: 79). 
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imposed by Indonesia since 2009, comprise several procedures such as requirements for a 
permit and licensing, pre-shipment examination, and a new labeling obligation. Although 
several new procedures support preceding ones, with intensified austerity. Some procedures 
involve overlapping bureaucracy between government institutions. Other measures also being 
used to stimulate local industries, such as local content obligations and export limitations, 
which meant to guarantee enough domestic stock. Sometimes, these procedures applied 
collectively, which resulted in an unwieldy and complex business setting (Patunru and 
Rahardja, 2015: 7). 
There are several problems, such as adjournments, uncommonly soaring costs, and 
disproportionate administrations, that business in Indonesia must deal with to trade with the 
global markets. Some surveys on business also realized that NTBs to trade affected around 
37 percent of business in Indonesia, which compared to other developing countries, this 
statistic is below than the average of 55 percent. However, business still has an obstacle in 
penetrating the global markets, problems which costing them in time and money. NTMs 
consist of various procedures on exports and imports, for instance, Rules of Origin (RoO) or 
quotas, and technical requirements (Gonzalez, 2013). 
Global Trade Alert (GTA) database stated that since 2009 Indonesia has applied 25 
NTMs, as compared to India with only 12 NTMs and Thailand 1 NTMs. Indonesia implemented 
more on export taxes and limitations, compared to other neighboring countries such as 
Malaysia, Thailand, India, and China. The GTA categorizes trade measures using color-coded 
indicators (‘green,' ‘amber,' and ‘red’) to specify their level of ‘harmfulness,' and the most 
harmful indicated by red color. GTA also put Indonesia on the list of the worst “offenders” due 
to escalating protection since the global financial crisis. Based on GTA record, since 2009 
Indonesia has initiated 37 amber measures and 158 red measures. Also, the red measures 
affected 746 tariff lines, 45 sectors, and 181 trading partners (Patunru and Rahardja, 2015: 
7). 
Research by ERIA also observed that Indonesia’s NTMs are import-related NTMs with 
the total of 88.4 per cent, compared to export NTMs with only 11.6 per cent of the total of 638 
identified NTMs. Primarily, Indonesia uses import NTMs on technical measures, which relates 
to technical measurements, regulations and procedures, especially Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, technical barriers to trade (TBT), also pre-shipment 
inspections. Almost 89 per cent contribution to Indonesia’s import NTMs are technological 
measures, consist of 79 per cent of total NTMs, and 11 percent of non-technical measures 
(Munadi, 2016: 71). 
The increasing level of international economy and trade caused the advancement of 
standardization and regulations within industrial sectors, especially in products and services. 
Exported goods and services to international market must be compatible with the standard 
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condition. A country like Indonesia uses standards commonly as NTBs to protect their national 
economy and domestic market from foreign products that enter the domestic market, as well 
as from foreign competition. Indonesia uses standards in most of its industries. These 
standards mostly formulated and issued by the ministries/government agencies and related 
industrial players (US Commercial Service, 2015: 50). 
Several issues are causing the slow process in the realization of the plan to deal with 
NTBs removal. Those issues also relate to problems in distinguishing the NTBs and NTMs 
due to evolving government policies to reach an agreement among ASEAN members to 
determining and removing the NTBs which can be a lengthy process; and supply-side ability 
limitations (Austria, 2013: 79). Multiple NTMs are a common case in Indonesia, where three 
or more NTMs subject to almost 92 percent of products, which resulted in overlapping 
regulations/measures, not only from a single government agency/institutions but various 
agency/institutions. In order to take a further step in NTBs/NTMs removal to support the 
development of national manufacturing sectors and to be ready for AEC, Indonesia must 
harmonize and should be more transparent in implementing the NTMs (Munadi, 2016: 76). 
For Indonesia, this condition is less likely to improve within three years because it is 
clear that the government lean towards protectionism policy by implementing NTBs which 
resulted in limiting the competitiveness level in the domestic market, as well as producing 
more regulations that become barriers to trade. In consequence, Indonesia will not be able to 
eliminate the NTBs, especially in manufacturing sectors. Moreover, these circumstances are 
not consistent with what has been arranged on the AEC Blueprint. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This thesis tries to answer one main question: is the Indonesian manufacturing 
industry ready for the AEC? The analyzed sources and findings from the literature show that 
Indonesia’s manufacturing sector are still not ready for the full implementation of AEC. The 
regional economic integration is to be expected to have a significant influence on 
manufacturing, where trade barriers reduction and investments should produce more 
interdependence, stronger production networks, larger economies of scale, and wider access 
to product varieties. Deeper integration would support ASEAN to merge and utilize more fully 
the production advantages by its members, which leads to major productivity improvements; 
capitals are likely to lean on to manufacturing, steering to bigger imports of essentials 
resources and services from the rest of the world (Petri, et.al. 2012: 115). 
 Manufacturing industries play an important role for Indonesia’s economic “engine” 
because of its significant contribution to the national income. Although the national 
manufacturing sectors are growing rapidly, its level of competitiveness is still low. This 
condition displayed in the Indonesia ranking by UNIDO 2013 CIP Index, which placed 
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Indonesia on the rank 42nd. It is indeed, far to its neighboring countries and other ASEAN 
members. The Indonesian government and business sectors also admit that Indonesian 
manufacturing industries still not fully prepared for AEC implementation, due to the internal 
issues that need to resolve quickly so that it can align well with the AEC Blueprint. Indonesia 
must improve its manufacturing sector competitiveness to (or “intending to”) gain benefit from 
regional economic integration. 
 By applying the conceptual framework from Petri, et.al. this thesis can provide an 
explanation that, for Indonesia to obtain profit from the full implementation of AEC, there are 
two main factors to increase manufacturing sectors: (i) removal of NTBs; and (ii) improving 
the investment climate. The biggest problems in those factors are government regulation 
uncertainty and corruption which relates to investment protection, as well as the lack of 
sufficient infrastructures and access to financial support for industries to develop their 
business. Another problem that Indonesia need to resolve is related to the removal of NTBs. 
Especially the overlapping regulations and policies which issued by several ministries or 
government institutions. However, by looking at Indonesia’s current situation, it is difficult to 
achieve this in three years if Indonesian government is not able to address this issues. 
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